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956,ASHINGTON CASE LAW-1955
TORTS
Negligence-Apportionment of Damages Between Negligent and
Innocent Acts of One Defendant. Because of its unusual facts,
Hufford v. Cicovich1 presents an interesting and seldom raised question
of law: should a defendant whose one negligent act caused injury
escape liability for that act merely because the plaintiff cannot define
the degree to which a non-negligent act of the same defendant also
contributed to that injury? Infrequently is the court faced with the
necessity of apportioning damages between the negligent and innocent
acts of one defendant for the simple reason that, in the usual case, the
"but for" test establishes defendant's negligence as the culpable cause
of plaintiff's injury (but for defendant's negligent act, plaintiff would
not have been injured). The problem of apportionment more typically
is presented where defendant's negligent act combines with another's
negligence or with an innocent natural cause to effect plaintiff's injury.
Briefly, the facts of the Cicovic case were as follows: defendant
operated a restaurant in Tacoma adjacent to plaintiffs' clothing store.
Fire spread from the range in defendant's kitchen through the vent
pipes passing horizontally from a hood above the range through a
false ceiling to a chimney some twenty-five feet distant. The red-hot
vent pipes set fire to the adjacent wooden studding and supports which
held the false ceiling. Greasy smoke, entering plaintiffs' store prin-
cipally through an old pipe-hole, caused considerable damage to
plaintiffs' stock of goods. The trial judge, as the trier of fact, refused
to draw any inference of negligence on the part of defendant and so
dismissed the case.
On appeal, briefs of counsel for both sides were directed to the
question of whether defendant was negligent, of whether res ipsa
loquitur was applicable, and of the strength of the presumption which
must be drawn by the finder of fact when res ipsa loquitur does apply.
The supreme court correctly held that even if the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur applied with respect to the cause of the range fire, the
presumption of negligence raised thereby was sufficient only to get the
plaintiffs past a non-suit, and that the trier of fact was not bound to
make a finding of negligence.
However, departing from the points covered in the briefs, the
supreme court assumed for the sake of argument that although defend-
ant was not negligent in allowing the start of the original range fire, he
1 147 Wash. Dec. 818, 290 P2d 709 (1955).
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was negligent in failing to install the vent pipe at a safe distance from
the wooden structure (after notice of the hazard from the fire depart-
ment), thereby allowing the fire to spread into the studding. Notwith-
standing this assumption, the supreme court affirmed the lower court,
but solely on the basis of plaintiffs' inability to segregate the damage
negligently caused from that non-negligently caused.'
Had the court simply confirmed the trial court's finding that the
defendant was not negligent as to either fire, the case would not evoke
comment. Or, had the court considered the conflagration as but one
fire burning in two places, caused by multiple actions of defendant
(both negligent and non-negligent), there seems little doubt but that
the court would have awarded full damages to plaintiffs. If the damage
had been of an indivisible nature (for example, the destruction of
plaintiffs' premises by the two fires), no apportionment problem would
have been presented to the court, and, likewise, there is little question
but that plaintiffs would have recovered full damages. However, in
considering the range fire and the studding fire to be severable events
and in denying plaintiffs recovery because of their inability to segregate
the damage caused by each, the court set for itself a much more
complicated problem.
At heart, the problem is whether to spare a defendant, the exact
impact of whose negligent act upon plaintiff cannot be determined
because of other forces also contributing to plaintiff's harm, or whether
to compensate plaintiff at the risk of requiring defendant to pay for
damage beyond that which he caused. In these multiple-causation
cases, this problem is implicit in the court's initial determination of
whether defendant's act is a culpable cause of plaintiff's harm. Further,
in deciding what apportionment of damages, if any, should be made
among the several causes, the court must determine, if, and to what
extent, it will shift the burden of proof from plaintiff to defendant.
Admittedly, in the ordinary case, plaintiff must establish with reason-
able certainty the amount he has been harmed by defendant's negli-
gence, but where segregation and apportionment of damage to each
separate cause is impossible, as a practical matter, the court must relax
the usual rules if plaintiff is to have any chance of recovery.'
2 147 Wash. Dec. at 822, "Even if we were to disagree with the trial court... and
if we were to conclude that his negligence was the proximate cause of the ceiling fire,
the judgment of dismissal must still be affirmed, it being impossible to segregate the
amount of damage caused by smoke from the range fire (not proved to have been
caused by any negligence on the part of the defendant) and by smoke from the ceiling
fire (for which we are assuming the defendant was liable)."
3 PROSSER, TORTS § 45 (2nd ed. 1955), in discussing the problem states at p. 229,
[SUMMER
WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1955
In the present case the court assumed a causal relation between the
smoke from the negligently caused ceiling fire and a portion of the
damage caused to plaintiffs, and yet denied all recovery because of
plaintiffs' failure to sustain the impossible burden of damage segrega-
tion. The brief opinion, with its scant citation of authority, failed to
articulate the reasons for the court's choice. It is apparent that the
court did not clearly differentiate between the problem of plaintiffs'
ability to prove their actual total damage from the smoke from the two
fires (which burden plaintiffs obviously sustained) with the entirely
different problem of apportioning the known amount of damages among
the parties who must bear the loss. (Had the court perceived this dis-
tinction, it would not have cited Epner v. Carol Management Corp.4
as authority for its decision. The holding in that case was based on
plaintiff's failure to prove the value of certain damaged carpeting
after the tortious injury.)
Equally inapposite as authority, although cited by the court, is
Wintersteen v. Semler,' a malpractice action against a dentist. The
decision turned upon the inability of the plaintiff to establish a causal
relation between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's injury. The third
case upon which the court relied, Wappenstein v. Sckrepel' is factually
quite unlike the Cicovich case, and the basis for its holding can be
distinguished from that of the Cicovich case. In that case defendant
had negligently run over plaintiff in an automobile-pedestrian accident.
Plaintiff sought damages for pain and suffering and the expense of
treatment occurring at two separate times: the first, immediately after
the accident, for which damages were allowed; the second, some
months later, for which damages (including expenses for treatment
of high blood pressure, kidney or liver trouble, arthritis, and other ail-
ments most of which had existed, and for which plaintiff had received
treatment, prior to the accident) were denied. The court emphasized
plaintiff's failure to establish a causal relation between most of the
complaints and the accident, which failure should have been the basis
for the court's holding rather than plaintiff's failure to segregate costs.
Had the aggravation of these pre-existing conditions (or, indeed, the
"The requirements of proof usually have been somewhat relaxed in such cases, and
it has been said that no very exact evidence will be required, and that general evidence
as to the proportion in which the causes contribute to the result will be sufficient to
support a verdict. Cases are few in which recovery has actually been denied for
lack of such proof."
4142 N.Y.S2d 638 (1955).
5 197 Ore. 601, 255 P.2d 138 (1953.
0 19 Wn.2d 371, 142 P.2d 897 (1943).
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causation, initially, of others of them) by the accident been proved,
the case would have been in point. But the holding, it may be hoped,
would have been different in that event. In contrast are the facts of
the Cicovich case where, by the court's own assumption, a causal
relation existed between defendant's negligence and plaintiffs' harm;
plaintiffs suffered a single harm caused entirely by defendant's acts;
apportionment of damages among various causes was virtually im-
possible; defendant, if anyone, had superior opportunity to observe
the action of the damaging smoke from the midnight fire on defendant's
premises (defendant's employees were in fact present). In the
Wappenstein case, allocation of costs for treatment to the various ail-
ments was feasible, even though damages for pain and suffering might
not be so severable; further, any means of apportionment were
peculiarly within plaintiff's control.
The court quite unnecessarily sought to distinguish the result in
Dunseath v. Halleur.7 That case, dealing as it does with a contract
shifting risk of loss on a given date, is not really in point for a case
involving tort damage. Given a date upon which the risk shifted, the
court was compelled in the Dunseath case to fix the rights and liabilities
of the parties in relation to that date. The court in the Cicovich case
pointed out that in the Dunseath case the plaintiff suggested a possible
means for apportioning damages and, therefore, was allowed to recover.
However, from the evidence revealed by the briefs of both parties in
the Dunseath case, it appeared that damages to an orchard due to a
long-extended period of freezing weather were inherently no more
capable of logical division than were those in the present case.
It would seem that in deciding this case of first impression in
Washington, our court might profitably have considered its decisions
in other negligence cases, likewise involving multiple causation. Where
defendant's negligent act has combined with a natural event (act of
God) to cause plaintiff's harm, our court has imposed liability on the
defendant for the total damage caused.' There is some question as
to whether the Washington court would allow defendant to escape
liability by showing that, absent his act, the same losses would have
been suffered by plaintiff in any event. Certain of the language in
the case of Tope v. King County9 (supported by the rationale of some
7 41 Wn.2d 895, 253 P.2d 408 (1953).
8 Tope v. King County, 189 Wash. 463, 65 P2d 1283 (1937).
9 189 Wash. at 471, 472, the court stated that defendant was liable for loss caused
by his own act combining with the act of God, provided the loss would not have been
sustained by plaintiff but for such negligence of defendant. However, the court then
[SUMMEZR
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of the cases which it cites 0 and by the language in the cases citing the
Tope opinion"1) suggests that our court has adopted the generally
accepted view -1 2 that the jury may find defendant's conduct culpable
where, in fact, both the defendant's negligence and the act of God con-
tributed to plaintiff's harm, even though the act of God alone would
have caused the same damage. This seems clearly the proper view.
Where each cause has contributed to the result, in fact, it is not reason-
able to deny that either cause is a responsible cause solely because the
injury would have occurred in its absence. Nevertheless, in the cases
where the cause combining with defendant's negligence is non-culpable
(typically a natural event), there has been a reluctance on the part of
some courts to allow recovery on the theory that plaintiff is deprived of
nothing since the injury from the innocent cause would be non-com-
pensible.Y Certain of the language in the Tope opinion and in some of
the cases ' cited therein would seem to support this view, relieving
defendant of liability if, "but for" his negligence, the harm to plaintiff
would still have resulted. However, it should be remembered this
went on to say, "The burden of proof, however, is upon the defendant to show that
the loss is due solely to an act of God.' And further in support of this last statement
at p. 473, the court said, "....the burden was nevertheless, upon the respondent to
show that the damage to appellants was wholly unaffected by the waters which came
from the Betts area," (the waters for which defendant-respondent was responsible).
10 Atlantic Coast L.R. Co. v. Hendry, 112 Fla. 391, 150 So. 598 (1933) ; Chicago RI.
& P.R. Co. v. McKone, 36 Okl. 41, 127 Pac. 488 (1912); Miller v. Mobile & Ohio
R. Co., 265 Ill. App. 414 (1932) evidently adopts this view at p. 418 (though the
language is somewhat ambiguous) in saying that the "but for" rule cannot be
invoked by the defendant unless he is free from negligence that was a proximate
cause of the damage.
U1 Blessing v. Camas Prairie R. Co., 3 Wn2d 266, 100 P.2d 416 (1940). The court,
at p. 281, in holding defendant responsible for a train derailment (which might have
been avoided had defendant maintained a ditch of proper depth beside the railroad track
to contain slides) paraphrased the Tope case language, italicizing the latter portion,
"the burden of proof is upon the county to show that the loss is die solely to the act
of God." Schweiger v. Solbeck, 191 Ore. 454, 230 P.2d 195 (1951), a case in which
debris from logging operations contributed to a flood, also cited the Tope case at p. 200
to the proposition that defendant was liable unless the damage was due solely to the
act of God.
12 RESTATMIENT, TORTs § 432 (2) and illustration 7 (1932) ; PROSSM, ToRTs § 44(2d ed. 1955).
13 See Cook v. Minneapolis St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 98 Wis. 624, 74 N.W. 561 (1898);
also dicta in Kingston v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 191 Wis. 610, 211 N. W.
913 (1927) to the effect that defendant could successfully defend against an action
for damages caused by his negligently caused fire by showing a natural origin of the
fire which joined with it. Note the article, Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage,
47 HAtv. L. Rnv. 1127 (1934), supporting this view. Cf. Carpenter, Concurrent
Causation, 83 U. PA. L. Rnv. 941 (1935).
14 See supra, note 9, and note the additional language in 189 Wash. at 473, 474, to
the effect that defendant could escape liability by showing that the damage would
have occurred regardless of anything defendant did. The cases cited in the Tope case
containing language supporting this view are: Willie v. Minn. Power & Light Co.,
190 Minn. 95, 250 N. W. 809 (1933); Mulrone v. Marshall, 35 Mont. 238, 88 Pac. 797
(1907) ; Raish v. Orchard Canal Co., 67 Mont. 140, 218 Pac. 655 (1933).
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reasoning has not been used to deny recovery in this jurisdiction;
recovery to plaintiff was allowed in the Tope case and in all the cases
cited in support of the holding in that case. Where the concurring
cause was not a natural event and yet not attributable to another's
negligence, our court has likewise allowed recovery to plaintiff."5
Once the Washington court has established that defendant's negli-
gence was a culpable cause in the act of God cases, it imposes liability
on the defendant for the total harm (even in the cases where the
damage is of a severable nature)." The Washington view accords with
that of the Restatement, 7 but it is interesting to note that the majority
of courts are unwilling to go so far, imposing liability on defendant for
no more than his proportionate share of the total damage.' 8
In those cases in which the negligent acts of independent tort-
feasors contribute to an indivisible injury to plaintiff, the Washington
court has held that each person found to be negligent is liable for the
total injury." The tort-feasors need not be acting in concert; each
is totally responsible, provided his negligence is found to have con-
tributed substantially to the injury. A recent Washington case, Maas
v. Perkins,"0 in which joint tort-feasors caused injury of a divisible
nature (plant and soil damage from oil sludge seeping onto plaintiff's
land from defendant's higher-lying land) did deny recovery to plaintiff,
because of plaintiff's failure to present evidence of the allocable share
15 Cole v. Gerrick, 62 Wash. 266, 133 Pac. 565 (1911). The court allowed recovery
to plaintiff for the death of a structural iron worker who was killed because of the
combined factors, an unsafe wall (for which defendant was not responsible) and
defendant's negligent failure to properly communicate signals.
16 Tope v. King County, supra note 8.
'7 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 450 (1934).
8 PROSSER, TORTS § 45 (2nd ed. 1955).
19 Mitchell v. Rogers, 37 Wn2d 630, 225 P.2d 1074 (1950), states the rule at
p. 648: "... each of the persons found negligent is chargeable as if solely responsible
for such cause." In accord: Caylor v. B.C. Motor Transportation, Ltd., 191 Wash.
364, 71 P.2d 162 (1937) ; Gabrielson v. Seattle, 150 Wash. 157, 272 Pac. 723 (1928) ;
Lindsey v. Elkins 154 Wash. 588, 283 Pac. 447 (1929) ; Young v. Smith, 166 Wash.
411, 7 P.2d 1 (1932).
20 42 Wn.2d 38, 253 P.2d 427 (1953). Cf. result reached in similar problem by the
California court in Calif. Orange v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., 50 Cal. App. 522,
195 Pac. 694 (1920). However Slater v. Pacific American Oil Co., 212 Cal. 648,
300 Pac. 31 (1931) did refuse damages in a similar case although it granted an
injunction. PRossR, TORTS § 45 n.87 (2nd ed. 1955) (cross-referencing to note 91
on the same page) states the Slater case is no longer the law in California. However,
the cases he relies on, City of Oakland v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 47 Cal. App.
2d 444, 118 P.2d 328 and Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 218 P.2d
17, misstate the rule of the Slater case, rather than overrule it. Cf. also the view of
the Texas court which has gone so far as to impose total liability on each defendant
who contributed separately to lake pollution by salt and oil seepage from pipe lines
(even though the injury was of a divisible nature by traditional tort concepts, the
Texas court considered it indivisible because apportionment could not be established
as a practical matter). Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex.
251, 248 S. W. 2d 731, 734 (1952).
[SUMME
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of damage caused by each defendant. It is interesting to note that no
mention is made of that case in the Cicovich opinion although it appears
to be the only Washington holding consistent with the court's position
in that case. Prosser notes the Maas case as one of the very few cases
to deny recovery completely because of plaintiff's inability to apportion
the damage between negligent causes.2 In view of our court's imposi-
tion of total liability in the independent-innocent-cause cases once
causation has been established (even though the damage is divisible)
as well as in the multiple-tort-feasor cases where an indivisible injury
has been sustained by plaintiff, the Maas and Cicovich cases seem oddly
inconsistent.
A line of cases which might be advanced to explain the result
reached in the two cases denies recovery on the basis that defendant's
negligent act operated on already damaged property or property of
little worth due to the imminence of damage or destruction from other
sources.2 However, no language in the Washington cases suggested
that the court relied upon any such rationale. As a practical matter,
in the two cases it is impossible to prove that defendant's negligence
became operative only after plaintiff's property was damaged severely,
nor can it logically be argued that defendant should be relieved of
liability in the successive cause cases where segregation and apportion-
ment are equally unfeasible. For example, suppose the court were
faced with the two following situations:
(1) Defendant-doctor operated skillfully up to a point, then negli-
gently injured plaintiff causing serious injury and unwarranted pain
and suffering to plaintiff,
(2) Two defendants simultaneously injured plaintiff negligently. It
is inconceivable to believe that the court would require plaintiff in
example (1) to prove what portion of his pain and suffering was caused
by the part of the operation negligently performed in order to recover
any damages, while allowing plaintiff in example (2) to recover for all
his injury from either defendant. Yet such would be the logical result
from the above rationale.
21 PROSSER, TORTS § 45 n.87 (2nd ed. 1955).
22 Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 85 N.H. 449, 163 Atl. 111 (1932). The
court held in that case that if the jury determined the boy (for whose death suit was
brought) would have fallen to his death even in the absence of defendant's wires (on
which he was electrocuted), there could be no recovery (not because defendant was
not liable for his negligence, but because no damage was suffered). Cook v. Minneapolis
St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., supra note 13, can be rationalized on this basis. Hanlon Drydock
& Shipbuilding Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 92 Cal. App. 230, 268 Pac. 385 (1928),
is an eample of a case in which the court valued the damage caused by defendant's
delaying of fire-fighting equipment in terms of what further damage occurred to
property already damaged by fire.
19561
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The suggestion that the burden of apportionment of damages should
be shifted from the plaintiff in the Cicovich case is not without prece-
dent in many areas of tort law. Res ipsa loquitur, in effect, forces the
defendant to come forth with proof of non-negligence (proof of a
negative is a heavy burden). In a few recent cases in other jurisdic-
tions, courts have even gone so far as to allow plaintiff to invoke the
doctrine against several defendants (not all of whom were necessarily
negligent) to force them to prove their non-negligence."
In the conversion cases, defendant must show any diminution of
damages (usually occasioned by virtue of restoration of the chattel);
furthermore, where the property involved has a fluctuating market
value, courts have resolved doubts in the plaintiff's favor by allowing
him the highest intermediate value between the time of discovery of the
conversion and a reasonable time thereafter. It is far from certain in
these cases what actual damage plaintiff has suffered for it cannot be
known in what manner he would have dealt with the property had it
been left in his possession. If any sympathy for the defendant is
shown in the commingling cases, it is only to allow him to prove affirm-
atively what goods are his. Absent such proof, plaintiff recovers from
the wrongful commingler all those goods which are dearly his plus
those whose ownership is in doubt. Our court has been equally indis-
posed to coddle the defendant in refusing him the right of contribution
from other tort feasors who also were responsible for the injury for
which he must compensate in full. To relieve the plaintiff of the diffi-
cult task of proving a negative, defendant must come forward to show
truth in libel cases, self-defense in assault and battery cases, contribu-
tory negligence in negligence cases. In the Cicovich case, by analogy,
it would seem that where all of the acts in question were those of
defendant (some of which were wrongful) he should be required to
come forward with proof of any lessening of his liability by reason of
damage attributable to smoke from the innocently-caused fire.
In view of the fact that all of plaintiff's damage was caused by
defendant's conduct (at least part of which was negligent), it would
seem that our court's choice could lie only between total and partial
responsibility. In the few cases found where the courts were faced
with the same problem of damage apportionment between the harm
2 3 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). The plaintiff in showing
injury resulting from an external force applied while he lay unconscious in the
hospital, shifted the burden to defendants (doctors and nurses) individually to show
their own lack of negligence. Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kans. 613, 258 P2d 317 (1953);
Vogt v. Cinncinnati N. & C. R., 312 Ky. 668, 229 S. W. 2d 461 (1950).
(SUMMER
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caused by the negligent and innocent acts of one defendant, the courts
have held that plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages even
though he was unable to present any concrete evidence as a basis for
apportionment.2
A decision allowing full recovery to plaintiff (absent defendant's
sustaining the burden of providing damage apportionment) would
seem a more just result and would represent a more logical, consistent
development of Washington case law in this area than the decision
rendered in Hufford v. Cicovich. The present holding is to be the more
lamented in the torts area, as contrasted to the contracts area where,
once the law is fixed and certain, the parties can agree in advance to
the terms they wish, while here no action by the parties in advance
can shift the burden or mitigate the harsh result.
BETTY B. FLETCHER
Negligence-Agent's Duty Toward Third Persons. In Riste v.
General Electric Co.,2" the plaintiff was employed by the defendant
company. Defendant, Dr. Phillip Fuqua, was in charge of an indus-
trial medical service maintained by the company. During his employ-
ment the plaintiff was physically examined during two successive years.
At both times X-rays were taken which revealed active tuberculosis
in the plaintiff's right lung. The company notified the plaintiff that he
had nothing seriously wrong with him and the plaintiff was unaware
of the tubercular condition. The company continued to assign him
to tasks which aggravated his condition until it became so advanced
that hospitalization and surgery became necessary.
In the lower court a demurrer to the complaint was sustained on the
grounds of the running of the statute of limitations, failure of the
complaint to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and
24 See Jenkins v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 67 NJ.L. 331, 51 Atl. 704, 57 L.R.A. 309
(1902). In awarding compensatory damages to plaintiff, under difficulties similar to
those facing the court in the Cicovich case, the court said in 51 Atl. at p. 705, "It was
as impossible for the plaintiff to adduce evidence separating the necessary from the
unnecessary damage, as for the defendant to split up each smoke cloud into two, label
one, 'Necessary,' and the other 'Unnecessary,' and send them separately to the plaintiff's
premises. The question of whether, in a case where the proof shows that a railroad
company has been guilty of a breach of duty in the respect indicated, and substantial
damage has thereby accrued to an adjacent property owner, the right to recover substan-
tial damages must be denied, by reason of the inherent impossibility of distinguishing
between such damage as is necessarily incident to the careful operation of the road,
and such as arises from the negligent and unskillful management of the road." Note
also City of Oakland v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra note 20, in which case,
the court stressed that any diminution of damages by virtue of injury arising prior to
the time defendant's duty arose would have to be shown by defendant.
25 147 Wash. Dec. 610, 289 P.2d 338 (1955).
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of improper unification of several causes of action.
On appeal by the plaintiff, the court reversed as to General Electric,
holding that the assignment of the employee to work which the em-
ployer knows to be beyond the capacity of the employee to perform
safely is negligence in the absence of assumption of the risk or contribu-
tory negligence. As to the defendant, Dr. Fuqua, however, the court
affirmed, saying:
It is not alleged that the respondent Dr. Phillip Fuqua, the agent of
the company, was appellant's physician, owed him any duty of treat-
ment, or assigned him to the task which aggravated his condition. It,
therefore, does not state a cause of action for malpractice or the
breach of a duty owed him by Dr. Fuqua. Accordingly, the demurrer
was properly sustained as to him.26 (Emphasis supplied)
The above quoted statement may refer only to a matter of pleading.
If this is the case, the court's choice of language, particularly where
it refers to a "duty of treatment" was unfortunate since it is hornbook
law that the allegation of conclusions of law is undesirable surplusage."
If, on the other hand, the court was making a statement of the duty
owed by an agent to a party not his principal, this paragraph appears
to be a direct reversal of the previous position of the court. However,
it should be noted that the problem was not pressed by the parties to
this action. A leading case on this point is Sheridan v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co.2" from our own jurisdiction. Sheridan was injured by
falling down an elevator shaft due to a faulty door mechanism. The
defendant was negligent in its inspections of the elevator, such inspec-
tions arising from a contract of insurance with the building owner.
In allowing recovery to the plaintiff, the court cited with approval, Van
Winkle v. American Steam-Boiler Company' and interpreted the hold-
ing in that case to say:
... in all cases in which any person undertakes the performance of
any act which, if not done with care and skill, will be highly dangerous
to the safety of persons, known or unknown, the law, ipso facto,
imposes as a public duty the obligation to exercise such care and skill. 0
26Id. at 611, 289 P.2d at 339.
7 1 SUTrIERLAND, A TREATISE ON CODE PLEADING, PRACTICE AND FoRas §§ 95-97
(1910). Dufur v. Lewis River Boom Co., 89 Wash. 279, 154 Pac. 463 (1916).
28 3 Wn.2d 423, 100 P.2d 1024 (1940).
2952 N.J.L. 240, 19 Atl. 472 (1890). Insurer of boiler held liable to strangers
injured by explosion of boiler due to negligent inspections by the insurer. Other cases
reaching a similar result cited favorably by the court: Wood v. Pullman Car Corp., 131
Ky. 142, 114 S.W. 754 (1908). Inspectors of a railroad car which caused injury to
brakeman due to faulty mechanism held liable. Lough v. John Davis & Co., 30 Wash.
204, 70 Pac. 491 (1902). Anderson v. London Guarantee and Acc. Co., 295 Pa. 368,
145 Ati. 431 (1929).30 Note 27 supra, at 434, 100 P.2d at 1029.
(SUMMER
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The problem here discussed arises from the difficulty in finding a
duty running from the agent toward the party injured. The contractual
duty between the agent and his principal tends to blind one from seeing
a duty of the agent toward any third party. But it has been said and
often quoted by courts in this country and in England, that "No man
increases or diminishes his obligations to strangers by becoming an
agent."" In the Riste case the contractual duty was between Dr. Fuqua
and the General Electric Company, but did his duty end there? The
doctor's contractual duty was to examine the company's employees and
by interpretation and communication of the results to company officials,
enable the company to fulfill its duty to its employees to assign tasks
not detrimental to their health. Dr. Fuqua was thus put in control
of a situation which determined the well-being of the company's
employees and if he negligently performed his tasks, one or more of
those employees might have been injured. Such an injury occured to
Riste. Assumption of control is the factor deciding the liability of the
agent to third persons. It is not dependent upon his contractual duty
to his principal which may be far greater than the duty to third persons
or on the other hand it may even be void (e.g., as in a contract with an
infant), but neither of these factors will affect the duty of the agent to
the third person. The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance
has no relevancy here. Dr. Fuqua performed at least part of his duty
toward the company by making the examination of the plaintiff and
after the examination, if not before, came into control of a situation
which caused the injury to the plaintiff. It was due to this control that
a duty arose between the defendant, Dr. Fuqua and the plaintiff."
-' Delany v. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123 (1882).
32 For detailed discussion of "duty to control" see Seavey, Liability of an Agent in
Tort, 1 S.L.Q. 16 (1916). With respect to duty to inspect property as ground of liability
for injury to third persons see Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 284 (1949). Some cases in jurisdic-
tions other than Washington concerning the liability of agents to third parties: Home
Insurance Co. of New York v. Michael Hoffman Fuel Co., Inc., 126 F.Supp. 652 (D.
Conn., 1954). Insurance company, as subrogee of its assured, allowed to bring action
over motion to dismiss where the assured was damaged by fire in a building allegedly
caused by negligence of fuel company in performing its contract with the owner of the
building, not the assured, to keep oil burner system supplied with oil and in good
repair. Bollin v. Elevator Construction & Repair Co., 361 Pa. 7, 63 A.2d 19 (1949).
Plaintiff allowed recovery against insurer who negligently inspected elevator. Pittsfield
Cottonwear Mfg. Co. v. Pittsfield Shoe Co., 71 N.H. 522, 53 Atl. 807 (1902). Party
under contract with the owner of a building to keep the building heated held liable for
damage to occupant of the building caused by bursting of water pipes due to freezing.
Waters v. Anthony, 252 Ala. 244, 40 So.2d 316 (1949). In an action by patron
of theater against the owner of the theater and the manager of the theater, the court
allowed recovery against both where the plaintiff was injured by damaged seat in the
darkened theater. As to the duty of the manager to the plaintiff the court said in 40
So.2d at 319: "It is not necessary that he have complete control of the operation of the
theater. But if he is performing his duties owing to his master under his contract, it
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In order to conform with the opinion and rationale of Sheridan v.
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.33 the court should have remanded the
Riste case for the determination of Dr. Fuqua's negligence as well as
that of the General Electric Company. It is difficult to believe that the
court intended to reverse that long standing decision without citing a
single authority in support of its change of mind or even mention of the
Sheridan case itself.
LUZERNE E. HuFFORDI, JR.
Libel-Misstatements to the General Public Concerning Public
Officers. With the decision of the Washington court in Owens v. Scott
Publishing Co.,"4 this state has fallen definitely within the ranks of
those which disallow any privilege as to the general publication " of
false statements of fact, or opinion based on false facts, concerning
public officers. This result was predictable 6 on the basis of earlier
Washington decisionsY It has been pointed out that these cases dealt
with the rule by way of dictum only."
Due to the confusion in this area generally, it is worthwhile to
attempt to clarify the various positions taken by different courts.
Those states which follow the so called "strict" rule will permit pure
opinion to escape prosecution for libel though it may be misleading.
The "strict" rule imposes liability for facts which are not true con-
was his duty to use reasonable care in the manner of doing it so as not to cause
injury to third persons exercising their lawful rights as patrons of the theater." Murray
v. Cowherd, 148 Ky. 591, 147 S.W. 6 (1912). Failure to inspect condition of tele-
phone poles by agent assigned to that duty by the company caused the agent to be
liable to a stranger who was injured when one of them fell. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 209 N.C. 304, 183 S.E. 620 (1936). Watchman at train
crossing held for not warning plaintiff's decedent of approaching train. Court put
weight on the decedent's reliance on the crossing guard. Wright v. McCord, 205 Ala.
122, 88 So. 150 (1920). Holding plaintiff's supervisor liable for negligence in building
structure.
33 Note 28 supra.
34 46 Wn.2d 666, 284 P.2d 296 (1955).3 5Printed in a newspaper generally known to the community.
36 See Comment, An Outline of the Law of Libel in Washlngton, 30 WASH. L. Rmy.
36, 44 (1955) ; 30 WASH. L. REV. 187 (1955).
37 Cohen v. Cowles Pub. Co., 45 Wn.2d 262, 273 P.2d 893 (1954) ; Gaffney v. Scott
Pub. Co., 35 Wn.2d 272, 212 P.2d 817 (1949) ; Ziebell v. Lumbermans Printing Co., 14
Wn.2d 261, 127 P.2d 677 (1942) ; Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d
847 (1933) ; Graham v. Star Pub. Co., 133 Wash. 387, 233 Pac. 625 (1925) ; McKillip v.
Grays Harbor Pub. Co., 100 Wash. 657, 171 Pac. 1026 (1918) ; Quinn v. Review Pub.
Co., 55 Wash. 69, 104 Pac. 181 (1909); Byrne v. Funk, 38 Wash. 506, 80 Pac. 772
(1905).
38 See Comment, An Outline of the Law of Libel in Washilngton, 30 WASH. L. REv.
36, 44 (1955). The dissent in the Owens case by judge Donworth, with the concurrence
of Chief justice Hamley and judge Hill and the substantial concurrence of Judge Ott, at
pp. 311-312, states that the result here reached was based solely on cases referring to the
question by way of dictum only and that these cases fell into two categories: (1) those
decided on demurrer and (2) those where the privilege was abused.
[SUMMER
114SHINGTON CASE LAW-1955
cerning public officers and for opinions based on such facts. The
"liberal" rule allows a false statement of facts where the requisites of
qualified privilege are met, and thus statements of opinion based on
such facts are also permissible. 9
Thus, in effect, the "strict" rule eliminates qualified privilege as to
general publication of statements concerning public officers. It can
be hoped that this decision will put an end to the misleading phrase,
"privilege ends where falsity begins," which has run through Wash-
ington decisions over the past thirty years.4  The true character of
the defense of qualified privilege is not based on truth or falsity of
statements but is grounded on other matters (e.g., publication was for
the purpose of protecting an interest of the publisher, or a third party;
publisher has a reasonable belief in the truth of the statement; etc.).41
The holding of the Washington court has, however, wiped out any
semblance of a qualified privilege and therefore there should be no
occasion to repeat the phrase.
In effect the court has said that comments or criticism, in order to
be privileged, must be based on facts which are true. The accepted
statement of the rule of privileged criticism is that such discussion is
privileged although defamatory if based on a true or privileged state-
ment of fact.42 The Washington court (along with the Restatement of
Torts § 598, comment a) when eliminating qualified privilege with
relation to statements concerning public officials in general publica-
tion, leaves only that such comment or criticism must be based on
facts that are true. 3
39 See SiEBERT, THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE PRESS at 331 (1934).
40 See cases cited note 37 supra.
41 See 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 593-605 (1938).
42 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 606 (1938).
43 There are two possibilities to which the Restatement rule may have had reference
,when it states "true or privileged" but neither are applicable to generally published
matters concerning a subject such as the one involved in the Owens case. By "privi-
leged statement of fact" the authors of the Restatement may have meant the conditional
or qualified privilege extended by § 611. This section renders reports of judicial or
legislative proceedings conditionally privileged but obviously this would not include
the statement about a public officer in the pursuit of many of his duties. Or the
Restatement language may have had reference to the absolute privileges discussed in
§§ 585-592. However none of the occasions of the absolute privilege pertain to publica-
tion of a newspaper so these would not bear on the type of situation the Owens case
presents. From an ex-amination of RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 1041 at 150 (Tent. Draft
No. 13, 1938), it is seen that the qualified privilege which the Washington court disal-
lowed was at one time incorporated in what became, in the final draft, § 598. The
language used in the present § 606-then § 1049-is unchanged and reference is made
back to § 598 thus leading to the possibly confusing situation of referring to a qualified
privilege that existed at the time the rule was formulated but was since stricken. The
essential point however is that the statement of the rule of privileged criticism of § 606
is limited in a situation like that presented by the Owens case to criticism based on
facts that are true.
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Courts adopting the contrary rule to the holding of the Washington
court in the Owens case, have followed the general reasoning set out in
the dissent to the decision by Judge Donworth. These courts have
argued that the defense of qualified privilege should include statements
concerning public officers in the performance of their duties when
stated in general publication. Thus these courts, by allowing a qualified
privilege in this area, will allow comment and criticism based on facts
which are not true if such facts are qualifiedly privileged. The choice
between the two views is obviously a matter of public policy."
The Washington court has followed the holding of the majority of
courts in the country.45 It has been stated that the minority holding
is gaining in support."
Arguments supporting the holding in cases adopting the "strict"
view most generally follow the idea that if the press is permitted to
print matters concerning public officers which are not in fact true, good
and honest men will be driven from the political arena, not being
willing to submit their name to this process." Advocates of the
minority line of reasoning have answered this grim prophecy by point-
ing to experience in those states which follow the minority where, it is
reported, the quality of public officers has remained unchanged." This
view poses the argument on the basis of policy, that public interest in
free discussion of public officers will suffer unduly if the qualified
privilege is denied.4
It appears that the Washington court could have adequately pro-
tected all interests involved by adopting this minority line of reason-
ing. Rules of libel, like other torts, would best be formulated along
lines of negligence rather than the liability of an insurer where such
liability can be avoided. A rule whereby statements of fact concerning
public officials even though false, would be privileged if the publisher
44 See Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HAgv. L. REv. 413 (1910).
45Noel, in an article in 49 COLUM. L. REv. 875 (1949), points out at 896-7 that "as
many as twenty-six states and the District of Columbia ... have held or definitely stated
that there is no privilege, while in only nine states have the courts held or clearly
stated that there is a privilege." A list of citations to the applicable decisions in the
various jurisdictions is there set out. This author argues the position taken by the
minority of the courts. See p. 891. For an article in support of the majority position
see Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HARi. L. REv. 413 (1910).
-461 BELU, MODERN TRIALs at 512 (1954) ; PRoSsER, TORTS at 840 (1941), but this
statement is omitted in the 1955 edition where it is simply stated, at 622, that there is a
"considerable minority" contrary to the more strict rule.
47 Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530, 540 (6th Cir. 1893).
48 Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875, 895
(1949).
49 An excellent discussion of the reasoning for both positions is found in Colman v.
MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
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acted in good faith and with due care, appears to be the better view.
The defendant publisher would still have the burden of establishing
his own good faith and non-negligence in gathering the facts, and this
seems a sufficiently forceful check on possible abuse of the rule.
Most written matter which becomes involved in suit for libel does
not clearly divide itself into statements of fact and statements of
opinion. On the contrary usually such articles intertwine the two
areas indeterminantly. That the majority holding makes it necessary
to decide on the very difficult question of what is fact and what is
opinion has often been recognized. 0 Since the majority holding
exempts statements of pure opinion from liability yet imposes liability
as to false statements and opinion based on false facts, it is seen that
the distinction between the two is necessary as the result of the case
will depend on an interpretation of the contents of the article. On
the other hand, the minority view does not necessitate this distinction
since both misstatements of fact, so long as made in good faith and
only after due care has been exercised, and misleading opinion, would
be outside the extent of liability. Certainly the administration of such
a rule would be more readily practiced and at the same time provide a
suitable balance to the policy considerations involved.
LEWIS GUTERSON
Intent-Necessity of Substantial Certainty. The Supreme Court of Washington in
Garratt v. Dailey, 46 ,Vn.2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955), clears up a possible confu-
sion on the trial court level of the element of intent essential to the commission of a
battery. Since the case involved the liability of a five-year-old boy for an alleged
battery, it is pleasing to note that the court well defines the issue. The finding of fact
made by the trial court was to the effect that the boy did not have the "purpose, intent
or design to perform a prank or to effect an assault and battery..." on the plaintiff.
The court, in an opinion by Judge Hill, remands the case for clarification on the ground*
that such a finding does not clearly meet the test of the intent necessary. It might be
shown that the boy knew with substantial certainty that his act would lead to the
fall of the plaintiff. Thus the court clears up an area where motive may have been
confused with the necessary element of intent and the true import of an actor's age is
put into the proper perspective. That is that age is a factor in determining whether
the actor had the necessary knowledge to have possessed substantial certainty.
That the Washington court is keeping the intent element in its proper perspective
is also seen in Boyle v. Clark, 147 Wash. Dec. 373, 287 P.2d 1006 (1955). This was
an action for alienation of affections in which the court, in rebuking a cross appeal
made by the defendent, points out that the "purpose [of defendent] need not be proven
independent of his acts."
Go SIEBERT, THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE PREss at 316 (1934); Veeder,
Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HA.v. L. REv. 413, 416-7 (1910) ; Noel, Defamation
of Public Offlcers and Candidates, 49 COLUm. L. Rrv. 875, 903 (1949) ; PRossFR, ToRTs
§ 95 (2d ed. 1955).
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